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Why Changes Must Be Made to the Standards of Review
Used to Determine Meaningful Attorney Involvement
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Eric M. Berman, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Collection attorneys have come under attack for sending dunning
letters to consumers. Consumers claim that the issuance and delivery
of the initial dunning letter is a violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act' (FDCPA) if the collection attorneys lack "meaningful
involvement" with the consumers' accounts prior to issuing each dun-
ning letter. The lack of meaningful attorney involvement causes each
dunning letter to be a "false, deceptive and misleading representa-
tion ' 2 that the communication (dunning letter) is from an attorney.3
Courts have crafted standards of review in cases in which attorneys
who sent dunning letters to consumers clearly had no meaningful in-
volvement in the collection process. 4 In those cases, the defendants
had sold the use of their letterhead to collection agencies or creditors
and had no participation in the actual collection of the debt. How-
ever, no clear standard has emerged in cases where the law firm send-
ing the dunning letter has the actual authority to act on behalf of the
creditor to settle or otherwise dispose of the debt, and actively does
so.
The courts have focused on three main areas of concern. First, what
authority must a collection attorney have from a client to act on its
behalf, and what actions must the collection attorney take on behalf of
its client to be meaningfully involved? Second, what level of review
must a collection attorney conduct prior to issuing a dunning letter?
* B.A. Hofstra University; J.D. St. John's University School of Law; Chief Executive Officer,
Eric E. Berman, P.C.; Vice President and Director of the National Association of Retail Collec-
tion Attorneys. I also would like to give credit to Ellen Calabrese, Esq., the firm's Compliance
Officer, and Matthew Corker, J.D., (admission pending), a legal assistant and soon to be an
Associate, for their help in providing research for the article.
1. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(o) (2003).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) (2003).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) (2003).
4. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996); Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001);
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993); Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 2002
WL 31255777 (7th Cir.); Taylor v. Perrin, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Finally, is the review of electronic data transmitted by a client suffi-
cient to allow a meaningfully involved collection attorney to issue a
dunning letter in compliance with the FDCPA?
This article will attempt to analyze these issues from the viewpoints
of: (1) the use of electronic data in commerce and the practice of law;
(2) consumer protection under the FDCPA in comparison to attor-
neys' obligations under the Federal Rules of Procedure and Federal
Rules of Evidence; and (3) attorneys' obligations under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rules, and caselaw. How-
ever, before these viewpoints are discussed, it is important to review
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
II. THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES AcT
The FDCPA was adopted in 1977. It is concerned with unlawful
debt collection practices, not mere disputes over the legality of the
underlying debts.5 Its purpose is to eliminate abusive practices by
debt collectors, insure that those debt collectors refraining from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,
and promote consistent state action to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses.6 Originally, attorneys were exempted from the pro-
visions of the Act. 7
In 1986 the attorney exemption was revoked.8 Attorneys were ad-
ded to the definition of debt collectors9 and became subject to the
requirements of the Act.'0 The loss of the exemption created a legal
tension, leaving a collection attorney caught between the duties a
"debt collector" has under the FDCPA and an attorney's responsibili-
ties under the Code of Professional Responsibility and Disciplinary
Rules. The resulting conflict has become a contentious source of liti-
gation - whether a dunning letter sent to a debtor by an attorney (or
law firm) is truly a communication from that attorney.
Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides:
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the
following conduct is a violation of this section:
5. Chambers v. Habitat, No. 02-1990, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11569, at *9 (7th Cir. June 9,
2003), reh'g denied en banc Jul. 22, 2003.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1977).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (1977).
8. A 1986 amendment to the Act, Pub. L. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (Jul. 9, 1986), deleted the
attorney exemption provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(6)(F).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1986).
10. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
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(2) The false representation of
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or
(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be
lawfully received by any debt collector for the collec-
tion of a debt.
(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is
an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.
(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to col-
lect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information
concerning a consumer. 11
Notably, there is no definition or reference to "meaningful attorney
involvement" in the statute.
Consumers argue that a collection attorney is not "meaningfully in-
volved" and cannot independently make the judgment necessary to
issue a dunning letter if the attorney fails to review all or some not yet
defined amount of account information maintained by the creditor.
Creditors customarily refer large numbers of cases in the form of a
spreadsheet or data file, and consumers claim that the review of the
data incorporated therein alone is prima facia inadequate to serve as
the basis of independent judgment. Though the basis of this alleged
breach is ethical, not statutory, the lack of meaningful involvement
causes any communication sent by the attorney to a consumer to be
false, deceptive, and misleading, thus a violation of the FDCPA.
The resulting problem is a somewhat simplistic standard of review,
easily applied to clear-cut cases of abuse, but which fails to consider
the nature of the relationship a legitimate collection law firm has with
its clients, including its duties, obligations, and grants of authority.
This standard also fails to take into account the use and regulation of
modern technology in commerce and the effect technology has had on
the practice of law.
The following sections will discuss the three primary areas courts
have focused their concern.
III. AUTHORITY AND ACTIONS
What authority must a collection attorney have from a client to act
on its behalf, and what actions must the collection attorney take on
behalf of its client to be meaningfully involved?
Determining if an attorney is meaningfully involved in the prosecu-
tion of a client's claim may appear simple, but it is quite vexing in
application. "Defining the practice of law has been a difficult ques-
tion for the legal profession for many years. The emergence of new
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2003).
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technologies such as the Internet has expanded the number of ways in
which legal advice and information can be disseminated, which has
increased the complexity of the task."12 "One size doesn't fit all.' 13
Commencement of the attorney-client relationship is when an attor-
ney renders advice or service to one who believes the attorney is using
legal knowledge or skill. This time is also when one is deemed to be
practicing law. 14 Courts and bar agencies struggling to define the
somewhat amorphous concept of the practice of law have come up
with several different tests. For example, the "commonly understood"
test defines the practice of law as composed of activities that lawyers
have traditionally performed.' 5 Another test used to define the prac-
tice of law focuses on the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
"[I]t is from the relation of attorney and client that any practice of law
must be derived.' 16
These opinions focus on the relationship existing between an attor-
ney and his client, not the attorney and his adversary. "For a person's
conduct to be considered the practice of law, there must be another
person toward whom the benefit of that conduct is directed .... The
conduct also must be targeted toward the circumstances or objectives
of a specific person.' 7 If an attorney-client relationship exists in
which the attorney is actively participating and providing services to
his client, and the client benefits from the provision of such services,
there is meaningful involvement.
FDCPA caselaw also examines the attorney-client relationship, but
its focus is on the lack of a meaningful relationship between an attor-
ney and his clients. If there is no meaningful relationship, there can-
12. Comments on the American Bar Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice
of Law, Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to the Task Force on the Model Definition of
the Practice of Law, ABA (12/20/02), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/20O2/12/lettertoaba.
htm. (Last visited April 30, 2003) [hereinafter FTC letter].
13. John Gibeaut, Bid to Define Law Practice Scaled Back - Task Force Instead Urges Juris-
dictions to Craft Their Own Standards, ABA Journal e-Report, Apr. 25, 2003 (quoting ABA
President Alfred P. Carlton Jr., available at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/a25define.
html.) (Last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
14. VA. SUP. CT. R., Pt. 6, § 1(B).
15. FTC Letter, supra note 12 (citing State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust, 366 P.2d 1,
9 (Ariz. 1961) ("We believe it sufficient to state that those acts, whether performed in court or in
the law office, which lawyers customarily have carried on from day to day through the centuries
must constitute 'the practice of law.'")).
16. Id. (citing Virginia v. Jones, 41 S.E.2d 720, 727 (Va. 1947) ("As a practical solution of the
question, it was deemed advisable to permit a real estate broker to prepare simple contracts of
sale, options, leases, etc., and to prohibit him from preparing legal instruments whereby the legal
title to property passes from the seller to the purchaser.")).
17. Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Definition of the Practice of
Law, at cmt. l(Sept. 18, 2002).
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not be meaningful involvement. In the following cases there was no
meaningful involvement because the defendants did little more than
allow their letterhead to be used by their clients for the purpose of
sending out dunning letters.
In Clomon v. Jackson,18 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a letter from a law firm implies that an attorney has
actually reviewed the claim and is actually handling the file. In this
case, Defendant Jackson acknowledged:
[T]hat he did not have any direct personal involvement in the mail-
ing of letters to Clomon (or to any other debtor): [sic] he never
reviewed Clomon's file; he never reviewed or signed any letter that
was sent in his name to Clomon. 19
The court held the letters "were not 'from' Jackson in any meaningful
sense of that word" since he did not play any day to day role in the
debt collection process.20
In Avila v. Rubin, the Seventh Circuit found no real involvement
when the attorney was not personally or indirectly involved in sending
the dunning letters to debtors and no real judgment was being ren-
dered.21 Instead the court characterized the attorney as having a
"cozy relationship with the 'referring' collection agency.2 2 Further-
more, the court stated:
Albert G. Rubin, acting as an attorney, was not the real "source" of
the letters in this case. The true source of the "attorney" letters was
the collection agent who pressed a button on the agency's computer.
"Albert G. Rubin & Associates, Ltd." is a collection agency, not a
law firm at all in any real sense of the term. The "law firm" does
not have a retainer agreement with plaintiffs' creditor. No attorney
working in the "law firm" ever files a lawsuit or goes to court on
behalf of a client. 23
It is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) for a lawyer to rent his let-
terhead to a collection agency.24 A debt collector is prohibited to "use
any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connec-
tion with the collection of any debt. ' 25 In Boyd v. Wexler, the Seventh
Circuit found that an attorney's renting of his letterhead to a collec-
tion agency would be in effect allowing the collection agency to imper-
sonate an attorney, and would violate the statute in that it uses a
18. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
19. Id. at 1317.
20. Id. at 1320.
21. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
22. Id. at 228-29.
23. Id. at 230.
24. Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).
25. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
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"false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney
or that any communication is from an attorney. '26
An attorney plays a mere ministerial role in sending the dunning
letters when he does not take any legal action in pursuit of the debt;
merely forwarded the letters to the collection agency rather than han-
dling responses; had no authority to negotiate the claim; and was paid
a flat fee per letter, regardless if the letter produced any result.27 The
Seventh Circuit held in Neilsen v. Dickerson, that, "the fixed and quite
modest nature of Dickerson's [the attorney] remuneration strongly
suggests that Household [collection agency] was paying for the mar-
quee value of Dickerson's name rather than his professional assistance
in the collection of its debts. '28
The attorney's review of the file and confirmation that the particu-
lar debtor's account was in fact outstanding prevented the Second Cir-
cuit from granting summary judgment in Miller v. Wolpoff, on the
issue of meaningful involvement 29 and use of attorney's letterhead.30
In Shapiro v. Riddle & Associates, P.C., the Second Circuit did find
that summary judgment was appropriate because Riddle "followed its
established procedures, comprised of eighteen steps, to ensure that,
inter alia, (1) an agreement between a debtor and creditor authorizes
the debt collection, (2) Riddle has the requisite and accurate informa-
tion on a debtor's account, (3) a debtor has no legal defenses, such as
bankruptcy, to assert against his or her debt, (4) a debtor's account
meets Riddle's criteria, such as minimum balance due and whether a
partial payment has been made, and (5) a collection letter to the
debtor complies with the FDCPA, based upon the determination of
Riddle's full-time compliance attorney.31
The common thread running through these decisions (other than
Miller and Shapiro) is that there was no relationship between the at-
torney and client beyond the sending of dunning letters.32 The
Clomon, Avila, Boyd, and Neilsen courts emphasized the lack of ac-
tual attorney involvement in their cases by underscoring the lack of a
26. Id.
27. Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 638 (7th Cir. 2002).
28. Nielsen, 307 F.3d at 634. Flat rating is a violation of §1692j(a) of the FDCPA.
29. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 312 F.3d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Shapiro v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C., 240 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), affd Shapiro v.
Riddle & Assocs., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24482, at *2 (2d Cir. 2003).
32. Unlike the defendant law firms in the other cases, both Wolpoff & Abramson and Upton,
Cohen & Slamowitz regularly and actively collect the accounts referred to them by their clients.
In May Co. v. Miller, Index No. 62272/2000, (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Civil 2000), Mr. Miller was sued and
settled the debt collection case. The plaintiff was represented by Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz.
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retainer agreement, the lack of review of letters or files, the lack of
day to day participation, the lack of supervision and control of the
collection process, the lack of the authority to respond to debtors' let-
ters, and the lack of authority to negotiate settlements or otherwise
dispose of cases.
A. What Must an Attorney do to be Meaningfully Involved?
The Los Angeles County Bar33 concluded that an attorney would
not mislead debtors (and therefore not violate ethical constraints and
professional responsibilities) by mass mailing collection letters on an
attorney's letterhead when (1) the attorney established a procedure by
which determinations were made to mail particular letters to particu-
lar people, (2) the form letter was initially reviewed by the attorney,
(3) the attorney supervised the staff, and (4) the staff followed the
procedures. 34 The Ethics Committee concluded:
If in fact a particular account is turned over to the attorney for col-
lection in the usual sense and a special attorney-client relationship is
thus created, then certainly it would not be improper for the attor-
ney to use the letterhead described for collection purposes .... In
the opinion of the Committee, under the facts, an attorney-client
relationship has been created.35
Furthermore, deception does not occur even when an attorney can
reasonably predict that no further action than the dunning letter will
be taken on the account, due to their diminimis value, other than gen-
erating computer originated attorney letters.36 The Committee found
that the accounts "have in fact been turned over to the attorney for
collection 'in the usual sense."' 37 Regardless of the attorney's consid-
eration of economic factors or the computer generated letters, the
previously established criteria used by the attorney in handling ac-
counts satisfies "collection in the usual sense. '38 The Committee also
is of the opinion that even as to those accounts which the attorney can
reasonably predict (e.g., by reason of the small amount involved, etc.),
will be returned to the corporation's credit department without any
action by the attorney section other than sending the computer pre-
pared attorney letters, such accounts have in fact been turned over to
the attorney for collection "in the usual sense" and, therefore, no de-
ception is practiced. The attorney has previously established criteria in
33. L.A. County B.A., Formal Op. 338 (1973).




38. L.A. County B.A., Formal Op. 338.
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accordance with which all accounts are to be handled. All the ac-
counts have been referred and turned over to the attorney for collec-
tion in accordance with previously established criteria. This is
collection "in the usual sense" even though economic factors may
enter into an attorney's decision to terminate collection efforts, and
the automatic implementation of such factors does not change the
situation.
Though the Clomon, Avila, Boyd, Neilsen, and Miller courts did not
set a standard which could be relied upon by collection attorneys, they
did provide some guidance by highlighting actions the defendants
failed to take. To paraphrase these decisions, to be meaningfully in-
volved, a collection attorney must do the things that Jackson, Rubin,
Wexler and Dickerson did not do. They must actively participate in
the collection of referred accounts. The courts did note that collection
attorneys can be in compliance with the FDCPA even if the attorneys
delegate part of the review process to paralegals or computer pro-
grams and do not have access to their clients' entire files prior to issu-
ing dunning letters. Most importantly, as discussed in Shapiro v.
Riddle, attorneys must have procedures in place, as well as control,
supervise, and actively participate in the collection process.
Limitations of the FDCPA affect lawyers engaged in consumer debt
collection, even where their conduct involves litigation.39 However,
lawyers do not receive increased scrutiny under the act solely because
of their profession, instead they are treated equally with debt collec-
tors under the FDCPA.40 As the Fourth Circuit held in Amond v.
Brincefield, Hartnett & Associates, P.C.,41
[The FDCPA] does not say that the collector's status as an attorney
should add a requirement of independent legal analysis for each as-
pect of the creditor's claim .... To interpret the FDCPA as not to
treat lawyers and debt collectors equally would contort the statute's
meaning, and ignore Congress' drafting and the Supreme Court's
interpretation.42
In his discussion of the application of the FDCPA to litigation in
Heintz v. Jenkins,43 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer wrote
that a litigating attorney who lost his case would not be liable if the
violation was unintentional and "resulted from a bona fide error not-
withstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
39. Amond v. Brincefield, Hartnett & Associates, P.C., 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 4815, at *8-9
(4th Cir. 1999) (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291(1955)).
40. Id.
41. Amond v. Brincefield, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 4815, at *8-9 (4th Cir. 1999).
42. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1997).
43. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295 (1995).
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avoid any such error. ' 44 The standard of review used in this instance
is preponderance of the evidence. 45 In Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff &
Niedenthal Co., L.P.A., cited by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Johnson v Riddle, involving an attorney sued under the FDCPA, the
court explained that a bone fide error defense to FDCPA actions must
be available to attorneys who make mistakes of law because other-
wise, "[i]f a lawyer who in good faith asserts a claim in litigation may
be held personally liable under the FDCPA, then he or she is
presented with an irreconcilable ethical dilemma. ' 46 "Ethical duties
to the client require the assertion of the client's best case. This col-
lides with strict liability if the legal argument loses."'47
To determine if meaningful attorney involvement exists, courts
should consider the totality of the attorney-client relationship. Exam-
ination of the extent of the authority granted by the client and the
actual role performed by the collection attorney in the entire collec-
tion process should be done. Courts should determine if there are
procedures in place and if the procedures are implemented and super-
vised by attorneys. In doing so, the courts will find that many of the
following benchmarks are evident when a legitimate collection attor-
ney is meaningfully involved:
(3) There is a retainer agreement setting forth the obligations, re-
sponsibilities and liabilities of both attorney and client.
(4) The attorney has knowledge and understanding of client prac-
tices and procedures including those related to delinquent
accounts.
(5) The attorney and client regularly communicate in regard to
collection practices and procedures and regularly update infor-
mation concerning individual accounts.
(6) The attorney and client have established processes and proce-
dures for the transmission of account information and the col-
lection of the referred accounts.
(7) The attorney has reviewed and retained copies of the con-
sumer contracts which govern the referred accounts.
(8) The attorney has actual authority from the client to act on its
behalf including the duties and obligations to contact debtors,
settle accounts, negotiate payment arrangements, respond to
communications from debtors and their representatives, and
otherwise dispose of the debt.
(9) The law firm is actively involved in the collection process if:
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Taylor v. Luper, Sheriff &
Niedenthal Co., 74 F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (S.D. Ohio 1999)).
47. Janet Flaccus, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Lawyers and the Bone Fide Error De-
fense, 2001 ARK L. NOTES, 95, 97 (2001).
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(a) The firm has processes and procedures for collection in
place and regularly collects account for its clients.
(b) Attorneys control the collection process and supervise
staff to insure that the processes and procedures are
properly implemented.
(c) Attorneys supervise the review of all information re-
ceived from clients.
(d) Attorneys draft the letters used in the collection process.
(e) Attorneys and staff regularly communicate with debtors.
(f) The law firm regularly negotiates settlements of accounts.
(g) The law firm regularly accepts and receives payments on
behalf of its clients.
(h) The law firm regularly responds to communications in-
cluding disputes and demands for validation from con-
sumers and their representatives.
Thus, a collection law firm is meaningfully involved when the law
firm's attorneys and staff actively participate in the collection process
under the supervision and control of attorneys, and the firm has actual
authority from its clients to collect and dispose of the referred
accounts.
B. What Level of Review Must a Collection Attorney Conduct
Prior to Issuing a Dunning Letter?
Neither case law nor the Code of Professional Responsibility de-
fines the minimum review a collection attorney must conduct prior to
issuing a dunning letter. Both indicate that collection attorneys can
rely on information provided by clients, so long as the attorneys are
meaningfully involved and have a reasonable good faith belief that
their clients are providing current and accurate information. With
these components in place, a collection attorney is in compliance with
the FDCPA when a dunning letter is issued, following a cursory re-
view of the initial information provided by a client. 48
In Boyd v. Wexler, the Seventh Circuit declined to set a minimum
standard of review.49 As long as the attorney is assigned to the ulti-
mate professional judgment in determining the existence of a valid
debt, the FDCPA can be complied with.50 Compliance in this instance
occurs regardless of whether part of the review is delegated to a
paralegal or computer program. 5' A minimum standard of review did
not need to be established, since the outcome of the case will depend
48. The review necessary to determine if litigation is appropriate prior to filing a lawsuit is not
discussed herein.
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on the jury's convictions.52 If the jury believes the plaintiffs, the attor-
ney did not review the dunning letter.5 3 If the jury believes the attor-
ney, then enough review was rendered. 54 Therefore, establishing a
minimum standard of review would be fruitlessly non-determinative. 55
In Miller v. Wolpoff, the Second Circuit also declined to set a mini-
mum standard of review.56 The court rejected plaintiffs request for
determination a minimum standard "requiring attorneys to review a
copy of the contract, a credit report, and a full payment history or
statement of account," reasoning that in many instances an attorney's
familiarity with the client's file would negate the need to review some
if not all of the documents the Miller plaintiffs seek to require.57
Debt collectors have the right to rely upon the information pro-
vided by their clients. In Smith v. Transworld Systems, Inc., the debt
collector made a mistake as to the amount of the debt because of a
clerical error on the part of the creditor.58 The Sixth Circuit rejected
adoption of a requirement of independent investigation of the collec-
tion debt. The court in Bible v. Allied Interstate,59 found it reasonable
for debt collectors to rely on the information submitted by creditors
and to believe creditors assertions that the debtor has not filed bank-
ruptcy.60 Attorneys are not held to any higher standard than collec-
tion agencies in relying upon their clients' files.61
In Shapiro v. Riddle & Associates, P.C., the Second Circuit found
that the attorney's precautions taken before sending the dunning let-
ters were sufficient under the FDCPA.62 Prior to sending the letters,
the attorney:
examined the agreement with plaintiff to ensure that charging a fee
was authorized, screened the group of accounts (including plain-
tiff's) that were referred for collection in order to ensure that they
met criteria necessary for inclusion in its information system and




55. Boyd, 275 F.3d at 647.
56. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 312 F.3d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 2003).
57. Id. at 304,
58. MANUEL H. NEWBURGER & BARBARA M. BARRON, 1 FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRAC-
TICES, FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION I 1.07[10][c] at 1-45, (A.S. Pratt & Sons
2003) (citing Smith v. Transworld Sys.. 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992)).
59. Bible v. Allied Interstate, 2001 WL 1618494 at *3 (D.Minn. 2001).
60. Hyman v. Tate, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4822, at *23; 2003 WL 1565863, at *8 (N.D. ILL.
2003).
61. NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 58 (citing Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824 (7th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022 (1998); Amond v. Brincefield, 175 F.3d 1013 (4th Cir. 1999)).
62. 240 F. Supp. 2d 287. 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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counts to ensure that partial payment had not been made, con-
ducted bankruptcy, change of address and current phone number
checks, and had a compliance attorney review both the account and
the collection letter. All of this takes time and costs money, as do
the insurance premiums that Riddle pays to cover its business and
the administrative and technical staffs it employs and the informa-
tion systems it operates.63
Due to the work done by Riddle (the attorney) for his client, Riddle
did not violate the FDCPA, and was entitled to summary judgment on
his claim for attorney collection costs. 64
Inasmuch as there are no specific standards of review proffered by
the law or the courts, there is no exact location to set the bar. It is
enlightening to compare the mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rules") and the ethical obligations under the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code") to the requirements of the
FDCPA, particularly since the Rules and the Code are primarily con-
cerned with matters already before the court, not the issuance of the
first communication from an attorney to a consumer.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented person is cer-
tifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evi-
dentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further in-
vestigation or discovery .... 65
The pre-filing inquiry must only be objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. 66 When the pertinent facts are beyond immediate in-
vestigation, the plaintiff's pre-filing investigation may be somewhat
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
66. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 11.11, at [2] (3d ed. 2003).
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cursory. 67 As to the factual basis, Rule 11(b)(3) provides that in
presenting a paper to the court, counsel is certifying that the allega-
tions and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or are
likely to have evidentiary support after the opportunity for further
investigation or discovery. 68 If, at the time an attorney filed a plead-
ing, reasonable practitioners could have disagreed over the existence
of a good faith argument in support of that paper, sanctions are inap-
propriate. 69 Rule 11(b)(2) is aimed at deterring legally frivolous fil-
ings and should not be applied in a way that would chill advocacy. 70
Legal contentions that are unsuccessful, but nevertheless merit serious
consideration, should not be sanctioned under Rule 11.71
Similar in purpose to the FDCPA's validation requirements 72 and
penalty provisions, 73 Rule 11(c) provides, "if, after notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision
(b) has been violated, the court may... impose an appropriate sanc-
tion upon the attorneys, law firms or parties that have violated subdi-
vision (b) or are responsible for the violation. ' 74 A party may make a
motion for sanctions 75 or the court, on its own initiative, 76 may issue
an order to show cause why the attorney or party has not violated
subdivision (b). However, the alleged miscreant has twenty-one days
to withdraw or correct the challenged paper, claim defense, conten-
tion, allegation or denial before sanctions can be levied. 77 In other
words, if the claim cannot be validated, the matter must be dropped.
Contained within Canon Seven of the New York Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zeal-
67. Id. § 11.11, at 11 [21-[4] (citing Dubois v. USDA, 270 F.3d 77, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2001) (it was
reasonable for government attorneys to rely on highly technical factual information obtained
from client, so that sanctions were properly denied); See also Lichtenstein v. Consol. Servs.
Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1999) (viewed at time of filing of amended complaint,
facts known to plaintiff justified suspicious activities of illegal activities by defendants).
68. Id. § 11.11, at T [1].
69. Id. § 11.5
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Hunter v. Eartligrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153-157 (4th Cir. 2002); Matta
v. May, 118 F.410, 414-16 (5th Cir. 1997) (though plaintiff lost, his claims were warranted under
existing state law, so sanctions were improper); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. American Motorists
Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 1128, 1133-1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (sanctions are appropriate for lack of prefiling
inquiry only if that failure results in a baseless filing)).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2003).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2003).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
75. MOORE, supra note 61, at § 11.01 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A)).
76. MOORE, supra note 61, at § 11.01 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B)).
77. MOORE, supra note 61, at § 11.01 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A)).
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ously within the Bounds of the Law"), Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)
provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another.78
However, Canon Seven recognizes that the law is under constant
change and that the law's boundaries are difficult to establish due to
factors such as, varying factual situations, developing constitutional in-
terpretations, poor statutory construction, and areas without prece-
dent.79  Therefore, attorneys may propound theories and
constructions of law that favor their clients, so long as they are not
frivolous.80 "The lawyer's conduct is within the bounds of the law,
and therefore permissible, if the position taken is supported by the
law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of the law." 8' As with Rule 11, the attorney
should have a reasonable good faith belief that the client's position
can be substantiated. 82
Interpreting the law in a light most favorable to one's own client is
permitted when confronted with a dubious question, due to the attor-
ney's obligation to his client. 83 Sometimes it is necessary to file the
suit before all the facts are known.84 According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, "beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the
attorney is to his client and not to a third party ... It is the attorney's
reasonable belief that the client has a tenable claim and not the attor-
ney's conviction that the client will prevail which is the measure of
probable cause ... 85 There will be no liability for the attorney ab-
sent an "'improper purpose on the part of the unsuccessful attor-
ney'. . . [supported by evidence] 'independent of the evidence
establishing that the action was brought without probable cause."' 86
Nevertheless, other restrailnts on attorney conduct are still in force.
Canons of professional conduct, as well as liability in instances of
fraud, collusion, or malicious prosecution remain in place to regulate
78. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, at (A)(1) (2002).
79. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-2 (2002).
80. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (2002).
81. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-4 (2002).
82. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4.
83. State Bar Grievance Adm'r v. Corace, 390 Mich. 419, 434 (Mich. 1973).
84. Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 923 (1975).
85. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879).
86. Callahan v. Simmons, No. 93-2024, 1995 WL 75418 at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995) (citing
Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 607 (Mich. 1981)).
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attorney conduct.8 7 "An attorney's liability does not end with being
answerable to his client. He is also liable to third persons who have
suffered injury or loss in consequence of fraudulent or tortious con-
duct on his part."88
Normally, attorney liability only extends to intentional torts, such as
fraud or abuse of process, when adversaries in litigation bring suit
against the attorney himself. Negligence in bringing or pursuing an
action usually fails to meet the standards for attorney liability. Policy
reasons are at the forefront of justification for this rule:
Public policy favors open access to the courts, a policy that would be
discouraged if an attorney was liable in the absence of malice. The
attorney is a zealous advocate for the client, and the attorney's zeal
should not be diminished by concern that an error in judgment will
result in liability to an adversary. The interests of the defendants
are protected, and the attorney is deterred from wrongful conduct,
in other ways, such as by the actions for abuse of process or mali-
cious prosecution and by disciplinary rules.89
Within the litigation context, the attorney's role is succinctly de-
fined and regulated. Ethical obligations, disciplinary rules, judicial
rules, and tort law all operate together to shape the attorney's role.
The attorney is obligated to be an advocate for the client and officer
of the court. He "owes the client loyalty, dispassionate judgment, and
aggressive advocacy. . . .[He] is constrained by prohibitions against
fraud to the adversary or the court, concealment or destruction of evi-
dence, maintaining spurious claims or arguments, and other similarly
egregious acts. Within those constraints, however, the duty to the cli-
ent is primary of being exclusive." 90
The issue of attorney liability was clearly laid out in Amond v.
Brincefield.91 Plaintiff claimed that lawyers, operating in the role of
debt collectors hold a "heightened duty to investigate" and cannot
rely on their clients' statements due to the FDCPA and attorney du-
ties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.92 The plaintiff further
argued that "Rule 11 duty of reasonable inquiry should extend to any
activity by a lawyer that constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA,
87. Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 435 (1978) (citing Sefi Fabricators, Inc. v. Tillim,
360 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (1973)).
88. Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 513 (1924); 1 EDWARD M. THORNTON, A TREA-
TISE ON ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 295 (1914).
89. Jay M. Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 735-52 (1996).
90. Feinman, supra note 89, at 752.
91. Amond v. Brincefield, Harnett & Assoc., P.C., No. 97-2582, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4815
(4th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999).
92. Id. at *7.
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thereby diminishing the ability of lawyer-debt collectors to rely on the
representations of their clients. 93
However, as noted above, the Fourth Circuit rejected those claims
and refused to create a heightened duty of investigation for lawyer
debt-collectors through a combination of Rule 11 and the FDCPA.94
As the court stated:
While a letter sent by an attorney after a lawsuit is filed arguably
presupposes that the attorney-collector has put on a new hat and is
now a litigator, not a collector, the Act still defines him as a collec-
tor, and the Supreme Court has con fined [sic] the litigator to the
standards of a collector. Filing a lawsuit does not insulate a lawyer
from the restrictions of the Act, nor does it expose him to standards
under the Act not applied to non-lawyer collectors.
Of course, Rule 11 (and equivalent state law sanction provisions)
applies to lawyers when they act in their capacity as litigators (as
opposed to debt collectors). Conduct by lawyers that violates the
established norms of Rule 11 remains subject to sanction. 95
Thus, if they are meaningfully involved, collection attorneys can
rely on the information provided by their clients and issue dunning
letters without additional investigation. So long as the attorneys have
the reasonable good faith belief that the information provided by their
clients is current and accurate, they do not violate the FDCPA when
they issue dunning letters following their review of the data received
from their clients, even if the attorneys have not had the opportunity
to review their clients' entire file.
C. Is the Review of Electronic Data Transmitted by a Client
Sufficient to Allow a Meaningfully Involved Collection
Attorney to Issue a Dunning Letter in
Compliance with the FDCPA?
The New York Civil Practice, Law and Rules defines "Electronic
Means" as being "any means of transmissions of information between
computers or other machines designed for the purpose of sending and
receiving such transmissions and which allows the recipient to
reproduce the information transmitted in a tangible medium of ex-
pression. '96 The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) allow the use of
electronic data as evidence of a form of writing or recording.97
93. Id. at *9.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 1997)).
96. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES R 2103(f)(2) (2003).
97. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, Moore's Federal Practice: Federal Rules of Evidence R 1001
(2003).
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"'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters, words or numbers or
their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing ...
magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form
of data compilation." 98 The definition of "original" includes an accu-
rate printout of any data stored in a computer.99
Rather than "reproducing the information transmitted in a tangible
medium of expression," namely printing statements of account and
sending them to their attorneys for collection, financial institutions
now deliver delinquent account information through electronic trans-
mission. Groups of accounts numbering in the hundreds or thousands
are regularly transmitted to large collection law firms. The transmis-
sions are in the form of an electronic spreadsheet or other data file
and contain the consumer's personal information including name, ad-
dress, telephone number and social security number, and account in-
formation such as the account number, the amount owed, the date of
last payment and the date the alleged debt accrued. Consumers claim
that an attorney's reliance on electronically transmitted information is
a per se violation of the FDCPA.
The consumer's position, in addition to being archaic and lacking
validity in light of the current developments in the law and business
practices, has no basis in law. Commerce in the twenty-first century
would be impossible without the use of electronic data. Financial in-
stitutions used to maintain their account information in large paper
ledgers. The courts did the same with their dockets. Neither do so
now. Computers and other electronic devices are used to maintain
and disseminate information. Consumers use the internet and auto-
mated teller machines to access their financial records 00 and make
purchases and payments. 101 Lawyers use PACER 0 2 and other com-
mercial software products to access the courts. Federal and State
Rules of Civil Procedure provide for electronic service and document
filing.10 3 Judges use computers in their courtrooms to access a variety
of data providers including electronic information furnished by the
parties before them.
98. Id. § 1001.6.
99. Id § 1001(3).
100. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313.9(b)(iii) - (iv) (2003).
101. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2003).
102. Public Access to Court Electronic Records System, available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.
gov/.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D); E.D.N.Y, Civ. R. 5.2; N.Y. C.P.R., §§ 304 & 2103(b)(7). The
State of New Jersey has established an electronic filing system called "Judiciary Electronic Fil-
ing/Imaging System" (JEFIS), which is available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jefis/index.
htm (last visited June 4, 2003); A list of other jurisdictions using electronic filing can be found at
the web-site of Verilaw, available at http://www.verilaw.com. (Last visited June 4, 2003).
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In his testimony before the Federal Trade Commission, Alfred P.
Carlton, Jr., president of the American Bar Association, stated:
Today, the Internet presents an exciting opportunity for creating
new competition in distributing both physical and digital products,
and in providing services. At the same time, the Internet may pose a
threat to the public interest in other respects, by undermining sec-
tors of the economy that serve the public efficiently and responsibly.
The delivery of legal resources in the online world represents an
evolutionary change from the delivery of legal resources in the off-
line world.
[W]e need to look at the use of the Internet as a resource permitting
lawyers to interface with one another, as well as their clients. This
too advances e-commerce and makes the practice of law more effi-
cient, less expensive and, therefore, more widely available. 0 4
The Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar
Association recognized that the conversion and storage of paper docu-
ments to electronic data was commonplace. 0 5 The Committee ruled
that as an ethical matter, attorneys may utilize electronic storage of
such items as, retainer and compensation agreements, statements to
clients showing disbursements of funds, and bills to clients. 10 6 Fur-
thermore, it permitted the storage and use of such records by reliable
electronic means. 10 7 To support its Opinion, the Committee noted
"that the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
has recently... concluded that storage on optical disks was acceptable
to satisfy the records-retention requirements imposed upon invest-
ment advisers under SEC rules.' 1 0 8
The Committee also reviewed security and abuse issues. Recogniz-
ing the readily available mechanisms for transferring material from an
unalterable format to a readily manipulable one, thus rendering the
detection of alteration impossible without the inspection of the origi-
nal disk, the Committee found that this avenue for fraud no more pre-
sent with electronic records than already exists in the paper record
104. Alfred P. Carlton, Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet:
Federal Trade Commission Public Workshop, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/an-
ticompetitive/panel/carlton.pdf.
105. N.Y. St. B.A. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Opinion 680 (1996), available at 1996 WL 421805
[hereinafter Opinion 680].
106. Id. However, attorneys must keep the original hard copy records such items as: check-
books, check stubs, and bank statements.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing 1995 SEC NO-ACT. LEXIS 684 (Aug. 28, 1995)).
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system; since in the paper system records can be altered via use of a
photocopier or electronic scanner.10 9
Congress has clearly approved the use of and reliance on electronic
data. It has subjected financial institutions to numerous statutes and
regulations governing the use of consumer electronic data, including
the data's integrity, security and maintenance. 110 Financial institu-
tions are required to maintain and report accurate information."1 If a
mistake is made, the laws and regulations provide consumers with
means to correct the mistake prior to the consumer's account being
referred for collection. If an item on a billing statement is incorrect, a
consumer has the right to dispute that item.112 If an item on a credit
report is incorrect, the consumer has the right to challenge that item
and have it corrected.1 3 If an electronic transfer is incorrect, it too
may be challenged.11 4 If an item is not disputed, the financial institu-
tion has the right to treat that item as being correct.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act'1 5 (GLBA), through the enforcement
procedures assigned to the Federal Trade Commission, protects the
privacy of consumer non-public personal information (NPI) main-
tained by financial institutions. Financial institutions are required to
"insure the security and a confidentiality of customer records and in-
formation;" 116 "protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to
the security or integrity of such records;"117 and "protect against un-
109. Id. The Committee stated, "Paper copies retained as such are also susceptible of being
intentionally altered, however, by the use of a photocopier - or in a more technologically sophis-
ticated manner by transferring the paper document (even one that has been retained for years in
that form) to a computer file by means of an electronic scanner, altering it, and then printing it
back out onto paper before producing it in connection with a disciplinary proceeding. In short,
the various different means of record storage do not by themselves appear to affect the potential
for fraud in a material way." Id.
110. See, e.g., Financial Recordkeeping, 12 U.S.C. § 1953 (2003) (allowing uninsured bank or
financial institutions to retain or maintain records in an electronic or automated form); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2003): Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-6809 (2003); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§2801-10 (2003); Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601- 1667e (2003): See generally, Federal Reserve Board Reg-
ulations, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/regulations/default.htm.
111. Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (2003); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(s)(2) (2003).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1666.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(1)(A) (2003).
114. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693f(a) (2003); Regulation E, 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.11 (2003).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2003).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(1); Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R.
§ 314.1(a) (2003).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(2).
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authorized access to or use of such records or information which could
result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer." '18
Under the GLBA, "nonpublic personal information" "means per-
sonally identifiable financial information - (i) provided by a consumer
to a financial institution; (ii) resulting from any transaction with the
consumer or any service performed for the consumer; or (iii) other-
wise obtained by the financial institution."11 9 Financial institutions
are authorized to transmit this information "as necessary to affect, ad-
minister, or enforce the transaction. 1 20 They may do so provided
that:
the disclosure is required, or is a usual, appropriate, or acceptable
method, to carry out the transaction or the product or service busi-
ness of which the transaction is a part, and record or service or
maintain the consumer's account in the ordinary course of providing
the financial service or financial product, or to administer or service
benefits or claims relating to the transaction or the product or ser-
vice business of which it is a part.121
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 122 regulates the transmission and
use of consumer data by consumer credit reporting agencies
(CCRAS) such as, Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. All data de-
livered by financial institutions to the CCRAS is submitted via disk,
computer tape or electronic transmission. The reported data does not
consist of a list of every transaction on a consumer's account. It in-
cludes the current status of each account, essentially a summary of the
consumer's NPI. 123 The data is maintained by the CCRAS on their
computers and is made available to their subscribers via the internet
and on-line systems. There is no distinction made regarding the stor-
age medium 124 and this data may be used in the collection process. 25
CCRAS are required "to maintain 'reasonable procedures' to avoid
improper disclosures of consumer credit information. ' 126
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 127
(HIPAA) provides for the use and protection of consumers' "Pro-
118. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(3).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(7).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(7)(A).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681v (2003).
123. NPI is the information that financial institutions transmit to their attorneys when an ac-
count is referred for collection.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
126. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 19 (2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a)).
127. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
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tected Health Information" (PHI) which is defined as being a subset
of individually identifiable health information that is transmitted by
electronic medium or transmitted in any other form of medium.128
"Individually Identifiable Health Information" (IIHI) "is information
that is a subset of health information, including demographic informa-
tion collected from an individual" including information that relates to
"the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care
to an individual; and [ ] identifies the individual; or . . . there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the
individual. ' 129 "Electronic Protected Health Information refers to
protected health information that is created, received, maintained, or
transmitted by or on behalf of the health care component of the cov-
ered entity. '130
The Department of Health and Human Services proposed that se-
curity standards would apply to all electronic maintenance or trans-
mission of health information. "Electronic transmissions" would
include transactions using all media, regardless of its form: Even
"transmissions over the Internet (wide-open), extranet (using Internet
technology to link a business with information only accessible to col-
laborating parties), leased lines, dial-up lines, and private networks
would be included. '131
HIPAA allows the transmission of transaction information includ-
ing payment and remittance advice. 132 For all practical purposes, the
non-medical information included in the PHI and IIHI is the same
information included in the NPI.
Another electronic data issue raised by consumers is that the initial
transmission lacks sufficient information to allow collection attorneys
to make decisions concerning the status of the individual accounts in-
cluded in the transmission. Consumers demand that collection attor-
neys have the entire paper file in their hands prior to issuing the initial
dunning letter. They claim that no independent decision regarding an
account can be made absent the review of the entire paper file. The
consumers are wrong.
The initial electronic data transmitted by financial institutions to
their collection attorneys consist of summaries of all account transac-
tions as of the transmission date for all included accounts. The trans-
mission contains the same information reviewed by the financial
128. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2003).
129. Id.
130. 45 C.F.R. § 164.105(a)(2)(i)(D) (2003).
131. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334-01 (Feb. 20, 2003).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2)(E) (2003).
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institution prior to referring accounts out for collection, and is the
same information, which was formerly sent out in paper form. Finan-
cial institutions are not required to repeatedly print every transaction
that took place throughout the history of the account on every state-
ment of account. They only list the transactions that took place during
the statement period. The initial electronic transmissions actually
contain more information than those final statements because the
statements mailed to consumers do not include the date of charge-off
or the date the last payment was made unless those transactions took
place during that statement period.
FRE Rule 1006 allows the use of summaries. 133 "Rule 1006 does
not apply solely to documentary charts or summaries. It also permits
witnesses to give summary testimony of their review of voluminous
writings, recordings, or photographs.' 1 34 Summarized data has been
admitted into evidence even though the data was summarized for liti-
gation purposes.1 35 Summary of payroll records was, itself, evidence,
admitted in lieu of payroll records. 136 Courts have admitted summa-
ries into evidence when the originals or duplicates of voluminous writ-
ings, recordings, or photographs are made available for examination
or copying at a reasonable time or place. 37 Unless the underlying
documents are provided when demanded, the matter cannot go
forward.1 38
The initial dunning letter must contain a validation notice setting
forth the consumer's rights and providing the consumer with the op-
portunity to review information used to validate the debt.139 If the
consumer disputes the debt, the attorney must cease collection efforts
133. MOORE'S FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET, 2003, PART 2: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,
§ 1006.5.
134. Id. (citing United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 2002) (witness' testi-
mony summarizing voluminous business records was clearly permissible under Rule 1006)).
135. AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1045 (7th Cir. 1990).
136. United States v. Weaver, 281 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
137. MOORE supra note 155, § 1006.5 (citing Air Safety v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 94
F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1996)).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2003); 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2003); See Swanson v. S. Or. Credit
Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225-1226 (9th Cir. 1988).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2003). For example, the letter should state: This firm serves as a debt
collector for our client. The purpose of this communication is to collect a debt and any informa-
tion obtained will be used for that purpose. Unless you notify us within thirty (30) days after
receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, we will
assume this debt to be valid. If you notify us in writing within thirty (30) days of receiving this
notice, we will obtain and forward to you verification of the debt, or if the debt is founded upon
a judgment, a copy of the judgment, and we will mail you a copy of such verification or judg-
ment. If the original creditor is different from the creditor named above, then upon your written
request within thirty (30) days of the receipt of this notice, we will provide you with the name
and address of the original creditor if different from the current creditor).
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until the validation is obtained and provided to the consumer.' 40 This
is still another chance for a consumer to challenge any mistake that
has survived the billing process, credit reports and notices of elec-
tronic fund transfers. The FDCPA validation notice requires only that
validation be provided upon the consumer's request, and unlike the
FRE,
[V]erification of a debt involves nothing more than the debt collec-
tor confirming in writing that the amount being demanded is what
the creditor is claiming is owed; the debt collector is not required to
keep detailed files of the alleged debt. Consistent with the legisla-
tive history, verification is only intended to eliminate the.. .problem
of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect
debts which the consumer has already paid... There is no concomi-
tant obligation to forward copies of bills or other detailed evidence
of the debt. 141
So long as the electronic transmission incorporates a current sum-
mary of each account, a collection attorney's review of electronically
transmitted data should be treated no differently than a review of
printed statements of account. The process of review is no different
from reading a printed statement of account except that the same in-
formation, formerly spread out over a one or two page paper docu-
ment, now appears in a row on an electronic spreadsheet. A
collection attorney would be in no better position to make an inde-
pendent decision concerning the validity of an alleged delinquency if
the attorney was given a paper statement of account to review. If the
information is incorrectly maintained the paper documents will con-
tain the same mistakes as the transmitted files.
The law does not require a meaningfully involved collection attor-
ney review an entire file before acting on it. It does not require the
attorney to review paper documents. It does require that before act-
ing, the attorney must have a reasonable good faith belief that the
data submitted by the client is current and accurate. The form and
sufficiency of that data is not defined. Financial institutions are per-
mitted to use electronic data and are highly regulated in its use. A
meaningfully involved collection attorney can reasonably rely in good
faith on the electronic data supplied him by financial institutions, and
in doing so, is in compliance with the FDCPA.
Thus, the review of electronic data provided by a client prior to
issuing a dunning letter is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
FDCPA, so long as the meaningfully involved collection attorney has
140. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-02, at 50109 (Dec. 13, 1988).
141. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1998).
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a reasonable good faith belief that the information provided is current
and accurate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Collection attorneys actively engaged in the collection of their cli-
ents' accounts are meaningfully involved if evidence shows that they
have actual authority to act on their clients' behalf and regularly do
so, and that they have processes and procedures for the collection of
debt in place under the control and supervision of attorneys. If they
are meaningfully involved, collection attorneys can rely on and use
electronic data transmitted to them by their clients. If they are mean-
ingfully involved, collection attorneys are in compliance with the
FDCPA when they issue dunning letters following the receipt and re-
view of electronically transmitted information from their clients.
